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Fishing at the Edge of Collapse: 27 Years of Common Fisheries Policy in Europe 
In 2001 I returned to Germany from the Philippines, where I had worked for 10 years mostly 
on tropical fish and fisheries. I soon realized that the status of European fish stocks was no 
better than that in developing countries. Despite considerable efforts by hundreds of European 
fisheries scientists, data were lacking for most stocks, and even for the best researched ones, 
internationally agreed reference points, such as the maximum yield that can be taken 
sustainably (MSY), and the stock size  required to support such catch were just not available. 
So, in the winter of 2008 / 2009 I sat down and analyzed the available data myself. The results 
made me want to cry. With few exceptions, fish stocks in Europe had been systematically 
decimated, even more so than in the rest of the world.  In stock after stock, excessive fishing 
of 3 to 5 times above the internationally agreed reference point had reduced biomasses to 10 - 
20% of their unexploited size. Extreme fishing pressure had shrunk cod to half of the length 
that our parents were used to. It had also reduced the natural adult lifespan of many years to a 
single spawning event, at best. Such fishing had effectively turned multi-spawning cod into 
single-spawning salmon. 
It took me a while to realize that the sad state of European fish stocks was not a natural or 
societal failure that management just could not overcome despite its best efforts. No, the fact 
that most fish stocks balanced on the edge of collapse was the desired outcome of the 
Common Fisheries Policy of Europe (CFP), in force since 1984. In September 1996, the 
European Commission had asked the Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES), its main 
scientific advisory body for fisheries, to provide reference points that carry a low probability 
of stock collapse. ICES obediently provided limit reference points for stock size and fishing 
pressure and so-called ‘precautionary reference points’ slightly away from those limits. 
Fisheries management subsequently used these boundary posts of viable stock sizes as targets 
for fisheries management, but overshot the precautionary boundary for catches by 40 - 50% 
on average, effectively aiming for stock sizes on the slope to collapse.     
Much of European fisheries research was dedicated to determine these boundary posts and 
next year’s stock size with the highest possible precision. But why had my hard-working 
colleagues accepted such a questionable role, which strikes me as being similar to that of a 
medical doctor at a water boarding session? Why were their considerable research efforts not 
dedicated to determine fishing regimes that maximize benefits for society while minimizing 
negative impacts on the stocks and the marine ecosystems? Why were economists and social 
scientists not welcome in ICES advisory bodies? Why was the public not fully informed about 
the dismal state of European fish stocks? Why were fishers not informed about sustainable 
high catches and profits that healthy stocks could provide? Why were the internationally 
agreed reference points for sustainable fisheries management not made available and 
promoted by ICES? 
These questions go to the root of the failure of fisheries management in Europe. The fishes in 
Europe’s seas are owned by the citizens of Europe. These citizens have entrusted responsible 
management of this public good to their national Governments, where it is typically given to 
the Ministry of Agriculture with its associated research institutes. These institutes employ the 
fisheries scientists. Typically the ministry-approved heads of such institutes or someone from 
the ministry are the national delegates to the ICES Council, which determines ICES policies. 
ICES working groups give advice on stock sizes and potential catches to the European 
Commission. After extensive consultations, the Commission makes recommendations for 
fisheries management and for next year’s catches. At several annual meetings in Brussels, the 
27 EC ministers decide about fisheries management rules and also decide for each of the 
European stocks the catches that may be taken in the following year. Back at home, the 
ministries and their agencies administer the implementation of the decisions that they have 
taken in Brussels. They also control compliance by fishers. Such concentration of explorative, 
legislative and executive power within one ministry does not exactly resemble what we 
learned in school about the importance of separation of powers in a democratic system.  
If this system was working in the interest of those who paid for it, fine. But clearly, it is not. 
The ICES Council has blocked inclusion of social sciences (including economics), effective 
public outreach, and anything resembling ICES taking a stand on behalf of European fish 
stocks. It also has limited ICES advisory outputs to what the ministers deem useful for their 
negotiations in Brussels. Enforcement of fisheries management by member states is lax, with 
cases where actual catches exceeded the agreed amount by more than 100%. Fisheries in 
Europe are subsidized to an amount that in some cases equals the value of the landed fish. 
Without these subsidies, European fisheries would be bankrupt, because the cost of hunting 
the few remaining fish exceed the income from selling the catch.  
Why did the ministers not act in the interests of the citizens who have elected them and who 
pay their salaries? Because the ministers are under constant pressure by the fishing lobby and 
only under occasional, if any, pressure by the public, which is made to believe that fisheries 
management is decided by bureaucrats in Brussels. The degree to which the European fishing 
lobby has infiltrated the system is astounding. Although the economic contribution of the 
fishing sector is less than, e.g., that of the industry producing sewing-machines, their political 
influence is considerable, probably because the public still has romantic notions about fishing, 
and because the media are drawn to stories of fishers blocking ports or dumping fish in the 
streets of Brussels. The European Commission has set up Regional Advisory Councils 
(RACs) which, among other, give recommendations on how to implement the scientific 
advice given by ICES. In these RACs, the fishing lobby has 2/3 of the seats, with the 
remaining seats being shared by all other stakeholders. If no consensus is reached, then 
decisions on recommendations are taken by simple majority, such as held by the fishing 
lobby, while other stakeholders may submit their minority opinion. But the main influence of 
the fishing lobby is probably exercised through their cozy personal relationships with the civil 
servants in charge of national fisheries, many of whom firmly believe that it is their job to 
protect the rights of their national fishing sector, including the rights to obtain subsidies and to 
overfish.  
The role of the European fishing lobbies is a particularly unpleasant one: In order to increase 
allowable catches, the lobby routinely discredits the scientists and their advice, denies the 
depleted status of stocks, fights the establishment of protected areas, defends the usage of 
destructive gears, insists on the right to catch juvenile fish, and requests the abandonment of 
closed spawning seasons and areas. In doing so, they destroyed the very foundation that 
fishing depends upon. As a result, profit margins of European fishers are about 3-6%, whereas 
profit margins of their colleagues in New Zealand, which has successfully reformed its 
fisheries, are about 40%. Given the considerable influence of the European fishing lobby on 
the system, why do they not act in the interest of their fishers, whose profits could multiply in 
a few years if stocks were allowed to recover? The answer to this question eludes me.    
Fisheries management in Europe culminates in the closed-door meetings of the Council of 
Ministers. While the public is exclude from this debate about a public resource, the fishing 
lobby is always only a cellphone away and often physically present in the building, being 
supplied with press cards by their national delegations. Decisions in the Council are typically 
taken by a 2/3 majority but need consensus if the Commission feels that its proposal has been 
ignored. That was recently the case in a preparatory meeting dealing with the threatened 
Atlantic bluefin tuna. The member states were unhappy with the proposal by the Commission 
which followed the scientific advice. They asked the Commission to leave the room, and then 
agreed unanimously with a few abstentions on much higher catches.  
While the ministers may change every few years, their civil servant advisors with their cozy 
relationships to the fishing lobby stay on and oppose any true change. As a result of years of 
midnight micro-management, the CFP has accumulated over 600 regulations, many of which 
contradict each other. For example, regulated mesh sizes catch smaller fishes than the fishers 
are allowed to land. These fish are then dumped dead at sea. The setting of next year’s catches 
has been described as political horse trading, with unholy alliances supporting each other in 
an effort to secure the highest possible share for the national fishing sector. Thus, Germany 
and Poland will support higher French catches in the Atlantic, and France will support higher 
catches in the Baltic. As a result of such coalitions, the cod and herring stocks in German 
waters are more strongly overfished than adjacent stocks. Since the proceedings of the 
meetings remain secret, the ministers can happily go home and wear blue ties at the next 
‘Save the Oceans’ event, because clearly, they themselves fought hard for healthy oceans and 
ecosystem-based fisheries management, but others prevailed.            
The situation described above is what Maria Damanaki was confronted with when, in 2010, 
she took over the post of Commissioner of DG Mare, the European Directorate General in 
charge of European fisheries. Building on the excellent Green Paper on the Reform of the 
Common Fisheries Policy of 2009, which officially documents much of what I have described 
above, she confronted the Council of Ministers with clear demands for rebuilding European 
fish stocks until 2015, in accordance with international agreements.   
Her courage has shown some success: Europe is gradually abandoning the fishing at the edge 
of collapse, and ICES now provides at least one of the international reference points (Fmsy) 
for 39 out of 190 commercial stocks. The number of stocks that are known to be on the slope 
to collapse has also slightly decreased. But will this be enough to overcome overfishing in 
Europe and in the rest of the World, where much of the European fleet is operating and where 
Europe plays a crucial role as the largest importer of seafood products? 
The proposal of the Commission for the reform of the CFP will be officially published on 13 
July this year. Considering the mess that we are still in, it proposes big steps in the right 
direction. The internationally agreed reference points will finally be recognized in Europe, 
allowing the stocks to grow away from the edge of collapse. Discarding of perfectly good fish 
for bureaucratic reasons will be phased out. But the proposal clearly falls short of similar 
reforms that have been enacted in New Zealand, Australia and the USA. These countries have 
precautionary fishing targets, slightly away from the reference points to account for 
uncertainty, and they close fisheries when stocks enter the slope to collapse. In contrast, 
Europe will have no precautionary margins and will gradually reduce fishing pressure only 
when stocks are on the slope to collapse, with no default rule for closing a fishery. Where the 
other countries have phased out or drastically reduced subsidies, the Commission only 
proposes to reshuffle subsidies. Also, the root causes of the CFP failure will not be addressed, 
i.e., the concentration of power with the agriculture ministers and the excessive influence of 
the fishing lobby. Such restraint may not be surprising, because the Commission is well aware 
that these very ministers and their lobbies will decide the implementation of the proposal and 
the future of fish and fishing in Europe.  
Do I have a final wish? Yes. Given the systemic failure of fisheries management as enacted 
by the ministries of agriculture, I wish Europe would leave them in charge of aquaculture, but 
give the management of wild fish to the ministers of environment. The Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive of 2008 shows that they have understood that only healthy ecosystems 
can support healthy fish stocks, which, in turn, can provide healthy profits from 
environmentally-friendly fisheries. 
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